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Recent Developments
RIZZO v. HAINES: AN ATTORNEY'S DUTY TO EXERCISE
ORDINARY SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONDUCT
OF SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Attorneys have always been called upon to perform many diverse
functions with differing responsibilities.' Recently, attorneys practicing
in Pennsylvania and nationwide have also had to contend with an increasing number of legal malpractice actions. 2 This trend has been specifically evident in the increase of malpractice actions involving
settlement negotiations. 3 Therefore, of particular importance to the at1. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer's
Responsibilities (1987), reprinted in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp.
1989). The Preamble specifically states:
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions.
As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding
of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical
implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer
seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others.

Id.
2. Bogutz & Albert, A Survey of the Developing PennsylvaniaLaw of Attorney Malpractice, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1237, 1237-38 (1988) ("Since the latter part of the
1960's, the number and variety of legal malpractice claims against Pennsylvania
attorneys has risen at a rapid rate."). For an interesting graphic display of the
increasing incidence of legal malpractice suits, see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE § 6, at 19, 21 (2d ed. 1981).
Courts have held attorneys liable for their negligence in a variety of situations. See, e.g., Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (applying
Pennsylvania law) (law firm liable to former client for failure to file claim within
statute-of-limitations period); Curran v. Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, 361
Pa. Super. 17, 521 A.2d 451 (1987) (law firm's failure through series of representations, acts and inaction to adequately represent client's interests in selling
business supported claim for legal malpractice); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Klein, 181 Pa. Super. 48, 121 A.2d 893 (1956) (attorney liable for
failure to discover tax lien on property purchased by client). The courts, however, have been careful to emphasize that an attorney is never liable to a client
for the mere failure to win a case. See, e.g., Gans v. Gray, 612 F. Supp. 608, 623
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law) ("To allow a plaintiff to bring a legal
malpractice action against his attorney merely because he obtained an unfavorable jury verdict would seriously impair the functioning of the judicial system.");
Hulstrand, Anderson, Larson & Boyland v. Rodgers, 386 N.W.2d 302, 304
(Minn. App. 1986) ("The mere fact that [an attorney] lost his case does not establish negligence.").
3. Annotation, Legal Malpractice in Settling or Failing to Settle Client's Case, 87
A.L.R.3d 168, 172-73 (1978) ("[T]here is a general trend toward increasing litigation and liability of attorneys for malpractice in cases involving the settlement
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torney practicing in Pennsylvania is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
recent decision in Rizzo v. Haines4 regarding legal malpractice and settlement negotiations.
In Rizzo, the court adopted a three-element test that a client-plaintiff
5
alleging negligence must meet in order to recover for legal malpractice.
In addition, the court held that an attorney must use ordinary skill and
knowledge in the conduct of settlement negotiations, and that this standard requires that an attorney communicate and investigate all settlement offers. 6 The court further determined that an aggrieved client
need not produce expert testimony to prove an attorney's breach of the
duties to investigate and communicate settlement offers. 7 Finally, the
court held that in order to recover for legal malpractice, an aggrieved
client must prove actual, not speculative, damages. 8
This article examines the analysis employed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Rizzo and demonstrates the impact of Rizzo on the
practicing attorney. 9 This article submits that Rizzo was correctly decided and that an attorney can be held liable for legal malpractice for
failing to investigate or communicate a settlement offer. Additionally,
while the Rizzo court failed to decide the issue, this article suggests that
an attorney should be liable for legal malpractice for unreasonably increasing a settlement demand.' 0
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Malpractice and Settlement

In Pennsylvania an aggrieved client may sue his or her attorney for
or compromise of a client's case"). For a general discussion of legal malpractice,
see Annotation, Attorney's Liabilityfor Negligence in Preparingor Conducting Litigation,
45 A.L.R.2d 5 (1956) and later case service (1980).
4. 520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (1989). Justice Stout wrote for the majority in
Rizzo.
This article will only address the issues surrounding the negligent conduct
of settlement negotiations discussed in Rizzo. It does not address the issues of
recusal and an attorney's financial transactions with his client which were also
discussed in Rizzo.
5. 520 Pa. at 499, 555 A.2d at 65. For a discussion of this test, see infra
notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
6. 520 Pa. at 499-500, 555 A.2d at 65-66. For a discussion of the relationship between legal malpractice and the conduct of settlement negotiations, see
infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text. For a discussion of an attorney's duty
to communicate and investigate all settlement offers, see infra notes 66-70 and
accompanying text.
7. 520 Pa. at 502, 555 A.2d at 66-67. For a discussion of the requirement of
expert testimony, see infra notes 76-83 & 112-18 and accompanying text.
8. 520 Pa. at 504-05, 555 A.2d at 68. For a discussion of the damages requirement for a legal malpractice claim, see infra notes 88-96 and accompanying
text.
9. See infra notes 100-18 and accompanying text.

10. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
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malpractice under either an assumpsit or trespass theory." I To maintain
a legal malpractice action in assumpsit, the plaintiff must prove there
was a contract and that the defendant attorney breached a specific provision of that contract. 12 However, to maintain an action in trespass, the
plaintiff must show that the attorney failed to exercise the proper standard of care. 13 Furthermore, to maintain any legal malpractice action,
the plaintiff must prove "an attorney-client relationship or a specific undertaking by the attorney furnishing professional services." 14 Generally, an attorney-client relationship can be proven by evidence of the
payment of a fee to the defendant attorney. 15 Moreover, "[i]n any cause
of action for malpractice, some harm must be shown to have occurred to
the [plaintiff]." 16
11. Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 55, 459 A.2d 744, 748 (1983); Duke &
Co. v. Anderson, 275 Pa. Super. 65, 70, 418 A.2d 613, 616 (1980).

12. Sherman Indus. v. Goldhammer, 683 F. Supp. 502, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Duke, 275 Pa. Super. at 70, 418 A.2d at 616. A
plaintiff might prefer to bring an action in assumpsit rather than trespass be-

cause of the availability of a longer statute of limitations. See Goldhammer, 683 F.
Supp. at 505-06.
13. Goldhammer, 683 F. Supp. at 506; Duke, 275 Pa. Super. at 70, 418 A.2d at

616.
14. Guy, 501 Pa. at 58, 459 A.2d at 750. Guy concerned the named beneficiary-executrix of a will who sued the attorney who had drafted the will and had

asked her to witness it. Id. at 50, 459 A.2d at 746. By witnessing the will she

ultimately voided her entire legacy and appointment as executrix. Id. The Guy
court held that the named beneficiaries of a will who lose their intended legacy
due to an attorney's negligence can bring suit against that attorney under a con-

tractual third-party beneficiary theory. Id. at 62-63, 459 A.2d at 752-53. In this

regard, the court adopted the view expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Id. at 59, 459 A.2d at 751 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 302 (1979)). For a discussion of Guy, see Bogutz & Albert, supra note 2, at

1240-43. For a general discussion of the requirement of an attorney-client relationship for a legal malpractice suit, see D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE:
LAw AND PROCEDURE §§ 1:1-1:5, at 1-12 (1980).

15. Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 537-38, 37 A. 98, 98 (1897). The court
specifically stated:
The payment of a fee is the most usual and weighty item of evidence to
establish the relationship of client and attorney, but it is by no means
indispensable. The essential feature of the professional relation is the
fact of employment to do something in the client's behalf. There must
be an agreement, express or implied, for compensation, but whether
payment is made in part or in whole by retainer in advance is not
material.
Id. at 538, 37 A. at 98; see Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Gulf Oil. Corp., 36
Leh. L.J. 461, 466, 74 Pa. D. & C.2d 431, 437 (C.P. 1975) ("Although the relationship of attorney and client may be implied from the conduct of the parties,
such conduct must evidence an offer or request by the client for legal services
and an acceptance of the offer by the attorney.") (citations omitted).
16. Guy, 501 Pa. at 56, 459 A.2d at 749; see Duke, 275 Pa. Super. at 73-74,
418 A.2d at 617 ("[A]n essential element of the cause of action, whether the
action be denominated in assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss.") (citations omitted). For a discussion of the Rizzo court's elaboration on the requirement of actual loss, see infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
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Since malpractice suits arise regarding many aspects of settlement,17 an attorney should understand the basic concepts behind settlement. A settlement is a contract which if valid concludes the parties'
litigation according to its terms.18 Pennsylvania permits a pending legal
claim to be settled and compromised by a valid contract of settlement. 19
In fact, it is the public policy of Pennsylvania to encourage settlements
for at least two reasons. 20 The first, and most important, reason is that
settlement is the quickest way to get money into the hands of a victim of
a tortious act. 2 ' The second reason is the need to reduce the burden
22
on, and the expense of maintaining, the judicial system.
A settlement agreement, voluntarily entered into, is binding upon
the parties, whether or not made in the presence of or approved by the
court, 2 3 and whether or not it is in writing. 24 Furthermore, a valid settlement agreement is conclusive and terminates the litigation not only as
to those matters actually litigated, but also as to those which could have
been litigated. 25 To be valid and enforceable, a settlement agreement
"must possess all of the elements of a valid contract, and like any other
17. See H. MILLER, ART OF ADVOCACY: SETrLEMENT § 16.40 (1983).
18. Gentile v. Silberman, 59 Lack. Jur. 209, 211 (Pa. C.P. 1958). For a gen-

eral discussion on settling a law suit, see C. CRAVER,

EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIA-

(1986).
19. Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., 458 Pa. 494, 500 n.3, 327 A.2d 72, 76 n.3
(1974); see Barson's & Overbrook, Inc. v. Arce Sales Corp., 227 Pa. Super. 309,
312, 324 A.2d 467, 468 (1974) ("Parties to an action may compromise a pending
legal claim by entering into a valid contract of settlement.").
20. Castillo v. Roger Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 1146, 1152 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying Pennsylvania law).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1153; see Walther & CIE v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 397
F. Supp. 937, 946 (M.D. Pa. 1975) ("The negotiation of a settlement is a part of
a judicial proceeding and is a judicially-favored way of disposing of litigation.").
23. Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341, 348 (W.D. Pa.
1972) (applying Pennsylvania law) ("no court approval [of a settlement agreement] is necessary under Pennsylvania law") (citations omitted), aff'd without
opinion, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974). In certain
situations, such as cases involving minors or incompetents, judicial approval of
settlements is required. See H. MILLER, supra note 17, §§ 17.70, 17.71; see also
Marquez v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 56 Pa. Commw. 188, 424
A.2d 975 (1981) (settlement of action to which minor is party requires either
administrative approval or judicial approval, depending on the type of action).
24. Pugh v. Super Fresh Food Mkts, 640 F. Supp. 1306, 1307 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (applying Pennsylvania law) (citation omitted); Kazanjian v. New England
Petroleum Corp., 332 Pa. Super. 1, 10, 480 A.2d 1153, 1158 (1984) ("[O]ral
settlement agreement is enforceable only if the parties, through their respective
counsel, assented to the terms and if a writing was not a condition of the
contract.").
25. Albright, 350 F. Supp. at 348 (settlement agreement is conclusive and
not subject to collateral attack) (citations omitted); Sustrik v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 413 Pa. 324, 326-27, 197 A.2d 44, 46 (1964) (Settlement is "conclusive, not only as to those matters that actually were litigated, but also of those
matters which could have been litigated therein.") (citations omitted); see Morris
v. Gaspero, 522 F. Supp. 121, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (settlement agreement extinTION AND SETrLEMENT
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agreement it may be attacked for want of authority or consideration, or
26
on equitable grounds warranting that it be set aside."
An attorney generally cannot, absent express authorization from
the client, settle a case. 2 7 An attorney must have express authorization
since "the litigant is the complete master of his own cause of action in
matters of substance; he may press it to the very end regardless of the
facts and law arrayed against him."' 28 However, the courts have enforced settlement agreements entered into by attorneys without authorization. For example, in Rothman v. Fillette2 9 the plaintiff's attorney
entered into an unauthorized settlement agreement and absconded with
the settlement payment after forging the plaintiff's signature on a release.30 Subsequently, the plaintiff sought to set aside the settlement
agreement and have his action reinstated against the defendants. 3 ' The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to set aside the settlement agreeguishes asserted cause of action and fixes rights and interests of respective parties in accordance with terms of agreement).
26. Sale v. Ambler, 335 Pa. 165, 169, 6 A.2d 519, 521 (1939) (citations
omitted); see School Dist. v. Framlau Corp., 15 Pa. Commw. 621, 627, 328 A.2d
866, 870 (1974) ("A settlement of litigation is a compromise agreement comprised of all the traditional elements of a contract.") (citation omitted). Contra
Pugh v. Super Fresh Food Mkts, 640 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (applying Pennsylvania law) ("The only essential prerequisite for a valid agreement is
that the parties mutually assent to the terms and conditions of the settlement.")
(citation omitted). "[A] contract is enforceable when the parties reach mutual
agreement, exchange consideration and have outlined the terms of their bargain
with sufficient clarity." Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 363 Pa. Super. 534, 539,
526 A.2d 1192, 1194, alloc. denied, 517 Pa. 607, 536 A.2d 1331 (1987).
27. International Org. Masters, Mates & Pilots, Local No. 2 v. International
Org. Masters, Mates & Pilots, Inc., 456 Pa. 436, 441, 318 A.2d 918, 921 (1974).
The attorney-client relationship alone does not give an attorney the authority to
settle a client's case. Garabedian v. Allstates Eng'g Co., 811 F.2d 802, 803 (3d
Cir. 1987) (citing Holker v. Parker, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 436, 452 (1813)); Smith v.
Delaware Valley Auto Spring Co., 642 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (applying Pennsylvania law) ("An attorney-client relationship does not, without
more, confer upon the attorney the authority to settle his client's case.") (citations omitted).
A client who has not authorized a settlement will, however, be bound by it if
he subsequently ratifies or accepts it. Appeal of Scott Township, 31 Pa.
Commw. 505, 509, 377 A.2d 826, 827 (1977) ("[W]here a litigant does not attempt to repudiate immediately the authority of his counsel to enter into a settlement, but rather accepts benefits flowing from the settlement, he ratifies the
act of his attorney and will not later be heard to complain that the attorney acted
without authority.") (citations omitted); D. MEISELMAN, supra note 14, § 10:6, at
171. Such acceptance or ratification must be knowledgeable and informed. Id.

The Pennsylvania courts will, however, enforce a settlement agreement
even absent express authorization or subsequent ratification. See infra notes 2934 and accompanying text.
28. Archbishop v. Karlak, 450 Pa. 535, 539, 299 A.2d 294, 296 (1973). For
a discussion of Karlak, see infra note 67.
29. 503 Pa. 259, 469 A.2d 543 (1983).
30. Id. at 263, 469 A.2d at 544-45.
31. Id., 469 A.2d at 545.
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ment.3 2 The court explained that it "believe[d] applicable.., the long
recognized principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer
because of the fraud of a third, the one who has accredited [the third]
must bear the loss."13 3 Therefore, the client bears the risk of an unauthorized settlement agreement. 3 4 The courts will set aside a settlement
agreement only when there is a clear showing of mutual mistake, or
fraud or duress on behalf of the party seeking to enforce the
35
agreement.
B.

Rizzo v. Haines

In Rizzo v. Haines, Frank L. Rizzo sued the City of Philadelphia (the
32. Id. at 266, 469 A.2d at 546.
33. Id. at 265, 469 A.2d at 545 (citations omitted); see Manzitti v. Amsler,
379 Pa. Super. 454, 469, 550 A.2d 537, 544 (1988), alloc. granted, 561 A.2d 742
(Pa. 1989). But see Archbishop v. Karlack, 450 Pa. 535, 539, 299 A.2d 294, 296
(1973) (court vacated consent decree entered into by attorneys without their
clients' consent).
In Manzitti, the plaintiff husband had brought a medical malpractice action
against a physician and hospital for personal injuries, while the plaintiff's wife
jointly filed a claim for loss of consortium. 379 Pa. Super. at 455-56, 550 A.2d at
537. The plaintiffs' attorney settled the case, but the plaintiffs alleged that the
attorney only had authorization to settle the husband's claim. Id. at 456-57, 550
A.2d at 538. Thereafter, the defendant doctor and hospital petitioned the trial
court to enforce the agreement, though no payment had yet been made in reliance on the agreement. Id. at 457, 550 A.2d at 538. The Superior Court, applying Rothman, held that the settlement agreement was enforceable as to the
plaintiff wife. Id. at 468-69, 550 A.2d at 544.
A separately filed opinion, however, pointed out a number of inconsistencies with the Rothman opinion and argued that unauthorized settlement agreements were unenforceable. See id. at 469-74, 550 A.2d 544-46 (Popovich, J.,
concurring and dissenting); see also Newton v. Supermarkets General Corp., No.
Civ. A. 88-4165 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989 WL 144104) (Disagreeing with Manzitti, court stated "the majority in Manzitti engaged in an
overly broad reading and unintended application of Rothman."). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted allocatur, but has not yet decided the case.
34. See Manzitti, 379 Pa. Super. at 469, 550 A.2d at 544 (Even assuming
client "did not expressly authorize [attorney] to settle her claim, the settlement
agreement nonetheless was still enforceable."). The aggrieved client can, however, "rely upon the other procedures established . . .to provide punishment
and to serve as a deterrent against repetition of such conduct." Rothman, 503 Pa.
at 268, 469 A.2d at 547. As one court has explained:
[A] third party who reaches a settlement agreement with an attorney
employed to represent his client in regard to the settled claim is generally entitled to enforcement of the settlement agreement even if the
attorney was acting contrary to the client's express instructions. In
such a situation, the client's remedy is to sue his attorney for professional malpractice.
Capital Dredge & Dock Corp. v. City of Detroit, 800 F.2d 525, 530 (6th Cir.
1986) (applying Michigan law).
35. Rago v. Nace, 313 Pa. Super. 575, 578, 460 A.2d 337, 339 (1983);
Greentree Cinemas, Inc. v. Hakim, 289 Pa. Super. 39, 42-43, 432 A.2d 1039,
1041 (1981) (Settlement agreement must, "in the absence of fraud and mistake,
be sustained.").
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"City") for injuries he received when he was rear-ended by a police vehicle.3 6 In an attempt to treat his injuries, Rizzo underwent three surgical
procedures which left him partially paralyzed. 3 7 Barton A. Haines rep38
resented Rizzo in his lawsuits against the City and his doctor.
Initially, with Rizzo's approval, Haines proposed $1,200,000 as his
client's settlement demand. 39 The City refused to pay that amount to
settle the case. 40 Haines reiterated that demand at a pretrial settlement
conference, 4 1 and the City responded by offering $300,000 plus a lifetime pension, which Haines did not accept. 42 Haines later testified that,
at the conference, he neither asked what was involved in the lifetime
pension, nor whether the pension was similar to a structured settlement. 43 Soon after that conference, Haines wrote two letters to the City
seeking another settlement offer and information regarding the pension. 44 At the second pretrial settlement conference, Haines, without
45
Rizzo's authorization, raised the settlement demand to $2,000,000.
46
The City's attorney responded by offering $50,000 to settle the case.
After the fourth day of trial, another settlement conference was held,
during which the trial judge offered to lend her assistance in obtaining
settlement by estimating damages of $550,000 for the case. 4 7 Haines,
without first informing Rizzo, rejected this figure. 48 The City's attorney
then stated that he was authorized to offer more than $550,000 and
asked Haines what he wanted. 49 Without inquiring how much more the
City was willing to pay, Haines reiterated his demand for $2,000,000.50
The City's attorney later testified that he was authorized to settle at trial
for $750,000.5'
In his action against the City, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
36. 520 Pa. 484, 489, 555 A.2d 58, 60 (1989). The plaintiff-appellee is not
related to the former Mayor of Philadelphia, Frank L. Rizzo. Id. at 489 n. 1, 555
A.2d at 60 n. 1.
37. Id. at 489, 555 A.2d at 60.
38. Id. at 489-90, 555 A.2d at 60.
39. Id. at 492, 555 A.2d at 61-62.
40. Id., 555 A.2d at 62.
41. Id. at 493, 555 A.2d at 62.
42. Id.
43. Id. Haines explained that he did not inquire about the pension offer
because Rizzo had previously applied for a disability pension and had been rejected. Id.
44. Id. The City's attorney did not respond to these two letters. Id.
45. Id. at 494, 555 A.2d at 62 (footnote omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Rizzo later testified that he had authorized Haines to settle the case
for $700,000 to $750,000. Id.
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Rizzo in the amount of $450,000.52 The lawsuit against the doctor was
eventually dismissed on the grounds that Rizzo's recovery in the suit
against the City had fully compensated him. 53 Rizzo then filed suit
against Haines alleging the negligent conduct of settlement negotiations
with the City.

54

Initially, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a three-element
test that a plaintiff alleging negligence must meet in order to recover for
legal malpractice. 55 The plaintiff must prove: (1) the employment of
the attorney or other basis for duty; 56 (2) the failure of the attorney to
exercise ordinary skill and knowledge; 57 and (3) that such negligence
52. Id. at 490, 555 A.2d at 60. After the jury rendered its verdict, Haines
assured Rizzo that his case against the doctor was still viable, and advised that
Rizzo take the money. Id. Haines never filed any post-trial motions. Id.
53. Id. at 491, 555 A.2d at 61 (citing Rizzo v. Rohrback, 8 Pa. D. & C.3d
122 (C.P. Phila.), aff'd without opinion, 261 Pa. Super. 455, 395 A.2d 995 (1978)).
54. Id.

55. Id. at 499, 555 A.2d at 65 (citing Schenkel v. Monheit, 266 Pa. Super.
396, 399, 405 A.2d 493, 494 (1979)).

This three-element test had originally

been adopted by the federal courts in Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Superior Court. See, e.g., Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir.) (applying Pennsylvania law) (quoting Schenkel v. Monheit, 266 Pa. Super. 396, 399, 405 A.2d
493, 494 (1979)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985); Storm v. Golden, 371 Pa.
Super. 368, 374-75, 538 A.2d 61, 64 (1988) (citations omitted); Schenkel v.
Monheit, 266 Pa. Super. 396, 399, 405 A.2d 493, 494 (1979) (quoting R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 123 (1977)). Schenkel was the first Pennsylvania case to adopt this test. See Schenkel, 266 Pa. Super. at 399, 405 A.2d at
494.
Many other states also require that these three elements be met to establish
a legal malpractice claim. See, e.g., Phillips v. Clancy, 152 Ariz. 415, 418, 733
P.2d 300, 303 (Ct. App. 1986); Hatcher v. Roberts, 478 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citation omitted), review denied, 488 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1986);
Phillips v. Carson, 240 Kan. 462, 476, 731 P.2d 820, 832 (1987) (citation omitted); Cavacos v. Sarwar, 313 Md. 248, 253, 545 A.2d 46, 48 (1988) (citations
omitted); Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 632, 503 A.2d 386, 389 (App.
Div. 1986) (citations omitted).
In addition to meeting these three elements, many states require proof of
actual loss. See, e.g., Phillips, 240 Kan. at 476, 731 P.2d at 832 (citation omitted).
For a discussion of the requirement of actual loss in Pennsylvania, see infra notes
88-96 and accompanying text.
56. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 499, 555 A.2d at 65; see Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47,
58, 459 A.2d 744, 750 (1983) (attorney-client relationship required before plaintiff can maintain legal malpractice suit). For a discussion of Guy, see supra note
14 and accompanying text.
57. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 499, 555 A.2d at 65. The exercise of ordinary skill and
knowledge "is measured by the skill generally possessed and employed by practitioners of the profession." Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir.) (applying Pennsylvania law) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985). It has
been asserted that in determining whether an attorney exercised ordinary skill
and knowledge, the Pennsylvania courts apply the "locality rule." Bogutz & Albert, supra note 2, at 1247-48. "The locality rule relies upon the commonly accepted practice among the attorneys practicing in the locale in which the
attorney-defendant is located." Id. (footnote omitted); see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT,
supra note 2, § 254, at 333 ("Consideration of the locality, such as local rules,

practice or custom, can determine the propriety of the attorney's conduct.")
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was the proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff. 58 These elements
(footnote omitted). That is, if the defendant attorney acted in the same manner
as other attorneys practicing in his locality, he will be found to have exercised
ordinary skill and knowledge. See Hoyer v. Frazee, 323 Pa. Super. 421, 427, 470
A.2d 990, 993 (1984) (attorney did not breach duty to exercise ordinary skill and
knowledge because he acted as other attorneys did in his county when facing
same situation).
The locality rule has been criticized as "not necessarily related to the exercise of professional judgment," especially given the modern trend of specialization in the legal field. Bogutz & Albert, supra note 2, at 1249 (footnote omitted).
It is uncertain whether the locality rule will continue to be the standard used by
the Pennsylvania courts. Id.
In determining whether Haines exercised ordinary skill and knowledge in
conducting the settlement negotiations, the Rizzo court did not rely on the locality rule. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
58. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 499, 555 A.2d at 65. Proximate causation is satisfied
when the plaintiff proves that he would have prevailed or at least achieved a
better result in the underlying litigation if the defendant attorney had exercised
ordinary skill and knowledge. Martin v. Northwest Wash. Legal Servs., 43 Wash.
App. 405, 409, 717 P.2d 779, 782-83 (1986); see also McHugh v. Litvin,
Blumberg, Matusow & Young, 379 Pa. Super. 95, 100, 549 A.2d 922, 924 (1988)
(plaintiff failed to prove causation in legal malpractice action since she could not
prove that she would have prevailed in underlying suit absent attorney's negligence), aboc. granted, 561 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1989). This third element has been
called the "case within a case requirement." See, e.g., Bogutz & Albert, supra note
2, at 1254; see also Harding v. Bell, 265 Or. 202, 205, 508 P.2d 216, 217 (1973)
("[T]he client must show that he would have won the first suit as one step in
order to win the second one.") (quoting J. WADE, "The Attorney's Liability for
Negligence," PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 231-32 (Roady & Anderson ed. 1960)).
This is the most difficult element for the plaintiff to meet. Id. at 204-05, 508 P.2d
at 217. For a further discussion of the "case within a case requirement," see D.
MEISELMAN, supra note 14, § 3:5, at 44-45.
It should be noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been urged not
to adopt the "case within a case requirement" for proof of proximate causation.
See Ferencz v. Milie, 517 Pa. 141, 145, 535 A.2d 59, 62 (1987). The court has
refused to decide the issue. Id. at 151, 535 A.2d at 65. One proposed alternative
to the "case within a case requirement" is the "substantial cause" test. Bogutz &
Albert, supra note 2, at 1255 (explaining and criticizing proposed use of "substantial cause" test). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has applied the "substantial cause" test for proof of proximate causation in medical malpractice
litigation. See Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 265, 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (1978)
(citations omitted).
It is interesting to note that on at least one occasion the Pennsylvania Superior Court has confused the third element with the requirement of an actual loss.
See Trice v. Mozenter, 356 Pa. Super. 510, 517, 515 A.2d 10, 13 (1986) (that
plaintiff must prove he would have prevailed in underlying action means that he
must prove actual loss), alloc. granted, 514 Pa. 643, 523 A.2d 1132 (1987). The
requirement of proximate causation is separate from the requirement of an actual loss. That is, proving an actual loss without proving causation is insufficient. See Amfac Distribution Corp. v. Miller, 138 Ariz. 152, 153, 673 P.2d 792,
793 (1983) ("Negligence alone is not actionable; actual injury or damages must
be sustained .... "); Phillips v. Carson, 240 Kan. 462, 476, 731 P.2d 820, 832
(1987) ("The elements of legal malpractice are ... that the attorney's breach of
duty proximately caused injury to the client; and that the client sustained actual
damages.").
The two requirements, however, are connected. The proof of actual loss
will involve "analysis of the value of [the] underlying cause of action."
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are only a restatement of the traditional elements of negligence: duty,
breach, causation and damages. 59 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did not decide the issue, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
60
the elements by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Rizzo court held that "the necessity for an attorney's use of ordinary skill and knowledge extends to the conduct of settlement negotiations."'6 1 It based this holding on both the importance of settlement to
the maintenance of the judicial system and because "settlement is the
faster way to get money into the hands of the victims of tortious conduct."' 62 The court also recognized "that a disappointed client may be
Whiteaker v. State, 382 N.W.2d 112, 114 (Iowa 1986) (citation omitted); see Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania
law) (Plaintiff must prove "that he or she would have recovered a judgment in
the underlying action in order to be awarded damages in the malpractice action,
which are measured by the lost judgment.") (citation omitted). For a discussion
of the actual loss requirement in a legal malpractice action for the negligent
conduct of settlement negotiations, see infra notes 88-96 and accompanying
text.
59. Bowman v. Abramson, 545 F. Supp. 227, 229 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (applying
Pennsylvania law); see, e.g., Malloy v. Sullivan, 415 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Ala.)
("The principle which governs a legal malpractice action based upon negligence
is the same as in any other negligence action, the plaintiff having the burden of
proving a duty, its breach which caused injury, and damages."), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 974 (1982).

60. Rizzo v. Haines, No. 79-623, slip op. at 28 (Pa. C.P. Phila. June 20,
1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 357 Pa. Super. 57, 515 A.2d 321 (1986), af'd,
520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (1989); see Hickox ex rel. Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.
2d 626, 633 (Miss. 1987) (plaintiff must prove elements of legal malpractice action by preponderance of evidence); Progressive Sales, Inc. v. Williams, Willeford, Boger, Grady & Davis, 86 N.C. App. 51, 55, 356 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1987)
(same); Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820, 829 (N.D. 1988) (same) (citation omitted); cf. Trice v. Mozenter, 356 Pa. Super. 510, 517, 515 A.2d 10, 13 (1986)
(plaintiff must establish by preponderance of the evidence that he would have
prevailed in underlying action), alloc. granted, 514 Pa. 643, 523 A.2d 1132 (1987).
The preponderance of the evidence test has been described as "the lowest
standard by which a party can carry the burden of persuasion." L. PACKEL & A.
POULIN, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 303.1, at 58 (1987) (footnote omitted). The
test is met when "the jury finds that the pan on the plaintiff's side of the scales of
justice has descended below the horizontal, while the defendant's dish has risen
above the level plane." O'Toole v. Borough of Braddock, 397 Pa. 562, 564, 155
A.2d 848, 850 (1959).
61. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 499, 555 A.2d at 65. The court explained that "the
importance of settlement to the client and society mandates that an attorney
utilize ordinary skill and knowledge." Id. at 500, 555 A.2d at 65-66. Numerous
other courts have held that attorneys may be held liable for failing to exercise
ordinary skill and knowledge or reasonable care in the conduct of settlement
negotiations. See, e.g., Whiteaker v. State, 382 N.W.2d 112, 115-16 (Iowa 1986)
(allowing malpractice suits against attorneys for failure to communicate settlement offers); Arana v. Koerner, 735 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Mo. App. 1987) (permitting malpractice suits against attorneys who settle cases without their clients'
knowledge or consent); Smith v. Ganz, 219 Neb. 432, 436, 363 N.W.2d 526,
529-30 (1985) (allowing malpractice suits against attorneys for failure to communicate settlement offers).
62. 520 Pa. at 499-500, 555 A.2d at 65. Specifically, the court explained:
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inclined to subject his or her attorney to the standard that only hindsight
may provide, and as a general policy there should be judicial reluctance
to relitigate suits in the guise of legal malpractice." '6 3 The court concluded that a decision which was an informed judgment and involved
the exercise of ordinary skill and knowledge cannot constitute legal malpractice. 64 However, the court stated that "an attorney may not shield
himself from liability in failing to exercise the requisite degree of professional skill in settling the case by asserting that he was merely following
'65
a certain strategy or exercising professional judgment."
Justice Stout, writing for the court, found that as a matter of law, the
duty to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge in the conduct of settlement negotiations required an attorney to communicate all settlement
offers to the client. 66 The court explained that this requirement "derives from the settled principle that an attorney must have express au'6 7
thority from the client to settle the case."
[V]oluntary settlement of civil controversies is in high judicial favor.
Judges and lawyers alike strive assiduously to promote amicable adjustments of matters in dispute, as for the most wholesome of reasons they
certainly should. When the effort is successful, the parties avoid the
expense and delay incidental to litigation of the issues; the court is
spared the burdens of a trial and the preparation and proceedings that
must forerun it.
Id. (quoting Rothman v. Fillette, 503 Pa. 259, 267, 469 A.2d 543, 546 (1983)).
For a discussion on the importance of settlement agreements, see supra notes
19-22 and accompanying text.
63. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 500, 555 A.2d at 65; see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra
note 2, § 580, at 723 ("Some courts, recognizing the vulnerability of the litigation attorney to hindsight reflections by a disappointed client, have stated that as
a matter of policy there should be judicial reluctance to relitigate as legal malpractice suits those cases which have once been settled or litigated.") (footnote
omitted).
64. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 500, 555 A.2d at 65 (citing Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d
338, 341 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985)).
65. Id. at 500, 555 A.2d at 65.
66. Id., 555 A.2d at 66 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 500-01, 555 A.2d at 66 (citing Archbishop v. Karlack, 450 Pa. 535,
299 A.2d 294 (1973)). In Karlack, the issue was whether the defendants were
bound by a consent decree entered into by their attorneys without their permission. Karlack, 450 Pa. at 538-39, 299 A.2d at 296. The court held they were not,
and explained that "the litigant is the complete master of his own cause of action
in matters of substance; he may press it to the very end regardless of the facts
and law arrayed against him." Id. at 539, 541-42, 299 A.2d at 296, 298. For a
further discussion of an attorney's lack of authority to settle a case, see supra
notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
The court also relied on three decisions from other jurisdictions. Rizzo, 520
Pa. at 500, 555 A.2d at 66. In Whiteaker v. State, 382 N.W.2d 112, 113 (Iowa
1986), the plaintiff sued the state for damages caused by the alleged malpractice
of a state attorney. The plaintiff contended the state attorney was negligent for
failing to inform him that the party he sued was willing to negotiate a settlement.
Id. The court held that "[a]ttorneys handling claims certainly have an obligation
to communicate settlement proposals to their clients." Id. at 115 (citations omitted). In the second case relied upon, Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 94 Mich.
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The court further held that an attorney has a duty to investigate all
settlement offers. 6 8 The Rizzo court explained that Haines had "a duty
to take reasonable steps to investigate the inquiries or offers that the
City extended ... [slince the client's choice to accept or reject a settlement offer must be an informed one."' 69 The court, however, cited no
70
case that directly supported this holding.
App. 419, 421, 288 N.W.2d 443, 444 (1979), the plaintiff alleged legal malpractice because her attorney failed to inform her that the defendant in her personal
injury suit was willing to settle. The court stated that "an attorney has, as a
matter of law, a duty to disclose and discuss with his or her client good faith
offers to settle." Id. at 424, 288 N.W.2d at 445 (footnote omitted). Finally, in the
third case upon which the Rizzo court relied, the court stated that the "failure to
disclose an offer of settlement and submit [it] to the client's judgment for acceptance or rejection is improper practice." Rubenstein & Rubenstein v.
Papadakos, 31 A.D.2d 615, 615, 295 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877 (1968), aff'd without opinion, 25 N.Y.2d 751, 250 N.E.2d 570, 303 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1969).
The Rizzo court also relied upon the Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility and the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. Rizzo, 520 Pa.
at 500 & n.9, 555 A.2d at 66 & n.9. The Code of Professional Responsibility
states that "it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer." PENNSYLVANIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1974) (repealed). Similarly, the Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "[a] lawyer
shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a
matter." PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1987).
For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct which have
superseded the Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility, see Packel,
Confidentiality under the PennsylvaniaAttorney-Client Privilege Statutes and the New Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 VILL. L. REV. 91 (1989).
68. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 501, 555 A.2d at 66 (citations omitted). In deciding
that the exercise of ordinary skill and knowledge required Haines to communicate and investigate settlement offers, the court never referred to whether this
was the common practice of attorneys in Haines' locality, Philadelphia. That is,
the Rizzo court did not apply the "locality rule" in determining exactly what the
exercise of ordinary skill and knowledge required in this case. It appears, therefore, that the court has set forth a state-wide rule that attorneys are under a duty
to communicate and investigate settlement offers. For a discussion of the "locality rule," see supra note 57.
69. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 501, 555 A.2d at 66.
70. Id. The court did, however, rely on Snyder v. Queen Cutlery Co., 357
Pa. Super. 456, 516 A.2d 71 (1986). In Snyder, the plaintiffs brought a legal
malpractice action against their attorney for failing to investigate the possibility
of a personal injury claim against the manufacturer of a machine. Id. at 458, 516
A.2d at 73. The plaintiffs sought to compel the inspection of the place where
the machine was located. Id. at 458-59, 516 A.2d at 73. In allowing the inspection, the Superior Court implicitly held that the failure to investigate a potential
claim can be grounds for malpractice. See id. at 460-61, 516 A.2d at 74.
The Rizzo court also relied on Giaramita v. Flow Master Machine Corp., 234
N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1962). In Giaramita, the plaintiffs sought to rescind a
settlement they had entered into with the defendant on the grounds that they
had incorrectly believed the defendant was in a poor financial condition. Id. at
818. In rejecting the plaintiffs' motion, the court stated that "[t]he responsibility
to investigate and prepare every phase of plaintiffs' case is upon their attorney."
Id.
Other courts have agreed with the Giaramita court and have held that an
attorney has a duty to investigate a client's case. See, e.g., Cline v. Watkins, 66
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The court found that Haines did not breach his duty to investigate
the pension that the City had offered to settle the case. 7 1 Specifically,
the court determined that Haines "took reasonable steps to ascertain
the pension value." 7 2 However, the court found that Haines clearly
breached his duty to investigate settlement offers when he failed to respond to the City attorney's comment at trial that Rizzo could get more
than $550,000 in settlement. 73 The court also found that Haines
breached his duty to communicate this settlement offer to Rizzo.7 4 Finally, the court concluded that "[s]ince the other elements of attorney
malpractice have been met, we hold that breach of these duties is suffi'75
cient to support a malpractice action."
The next issue the Pennsylvania Supreme Court faced was whether
expert testimony was necessary to establish the breach of the standard
of care with regard to the duties to investigate and communicate settlement offers. 76 The court noted the general rule that expert testimony is
only essential where it will assist the finder of fact in comprehending an
issue beyond the knowledge of the average person. 77 Justice Stout exCal. App. 3d 174, 178 n.l, 135 Cal. Rptr. 838, 840 n.l (1977) (attorney's standard of care required investigation of client's claim to relief in early stages of
litigation); Parksville Mobile Modular, Inc. v. Fabricant, 73 A.D.2d 595, 598, 422
N.Y.S.2d 710, 715 (1979) (attorney's duty to prepare and investigate must be
within "reasonable" bounds) (citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 49 N.Y.2d 801
(1980).
71. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 501, 555 A.2d at 66.
72. Id. According to the court, the reasonable steps included informing the
City of Rizzo's earnings and writing letters to the City's attorney seeking information as to what the pension offer encompassed. Id. Thus, Haines did not
breach this duty by failing to ask what the pension offer encompassed at the
pretrial settlement conference in which the offer was made. Id.
73. Id. The Rizzo court explained that "[d]espite the comment, [Haines]
took no steps to ascertain how much 'more' the City was willing to pay." Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 501-02, 555 A.2d at 66-67. Expert testimony in legal malpractice
cases refers to the testimony of attorneys. Sanders v. Smith, 83 N.M. 706, 708,
496 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 83 N.M. 698, 496 P.2d 1094 (N.M.
1972); Lenius v. King, 294 N.W.2d 912, 914 (S.D. 1980) ("In a malpractice action the jury decides, from evidence presented at trial by other lawyers called as
expert witnesses, whether a lawyer possessed and used the knowledge, skill, and
care which the law demands of him."). For a discussion on the requirement of
expert testimony in legal malpractice actions, see Annotation, Admissability and
Necessity of Expert Evidence as to Standards of Practice and Negligence in MalpracticeAction Against Attorney, 14 A.L.R.4th 170 (1982).
77. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 502, 555 A.2d at 66 (citing Reardon v. Meehan, 424 Pa.
460, 465, 227 A.2d 667, 670 (1967)). In Reardon, the plaintiff sued for injuries
sustained from tripping over the defendants' rug. Reardon, 424 Pa. at 462, 227
A.2d at 668-69. At trial, an expert testified as to the condition of the rug and the
defendants appealed the admission of this testimony. Id. at 464, 227 A.2d at 670.
In rejecting the defendants' contention, the court explained that "[t]he employment of testimony of an expert rises from necessity, a necessity born of the fact
that the subject matter of the inquiry is one involving special skills and training
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plained that "[w]here the issue is simple, and the lack of skill obvious,
the ordinary experience and comprehension of lay persons can establish
the standard of care." 7 8 The Rizzo court concluded "that [proving]
breach of the dut[ies] to investigate, and to inform one's client of, settlement offers does not require expert testimony." ' 79 The court relied on
Joos v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. 8 0 in support of this conclusion. 8 1 The

Joos court held that "[iut is well within the ordinary knowledge and experience of a layman jury to recognize that ... the failure of an attorney to
disclose [settlement offers] is a breach of the professional standard of
beyond the ken of the ordinary layman." Id. at 465, 227 A.2d at 670 (citation
omitted).
78. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 502, 555 A.2d at 66 (citing Lentino v. Fringe Employee
Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law)). Lentino
involved a claim of legal malpractice against two attorneys for their failure to
submit an employee retirement plan to the IRS for approval, and for suggesting
payments in violation of that plan. Lentino, 611 F.2d at 477. The Third Circuit
held that, in general, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of
care and whether it was complied with "except where the matter under investigation is so simple, and the lack of skill so obvious, as to be within the range of
the ordinary experience and comprehension of non-professional persons." Id. at
480 (citations omitted). The Lentino court affirmed the trial court's holding that
expert testimony was required in that case and thus, for lack of it, the case was
dismissed. Id. at 481; see Reardon, 424 Pa. at 465, 227 A.2d at 670 ("If all the
primary facts can be accurately described to ajury and if the jury is as capable of

comprehending and understanding such facts and drawing correct conclusions
from them as are witnesses possessed of special training, experience or observation, then there is no need for [expert] testimony.") (citations omitted).
79. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 502, 555 A.2d at 66-67 (citations omitted). However,
in most legal malpractice cases, including those involving settlement, expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care and its breach. See, e.g.,
Applegate v. Dobrovir, Oakes & Gebhardt, 628 F. Supp. 378, 382 (D.D.C. 1985)

(expert testimony required where plaintiff alleged attorneys induced settlement), aff'd without opinion, 809 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049
(1987); Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 345, 247 S.E.2d 107, 111 (1978)
("except in clear and palpable cases (such as the expiration of a statute of limitation), expert testimony is necessary to establish the parameters of acceptable
professional conduct") (citations omitted); Spaulding v. Hussain, 229 N.J.
Super. 430, 443, 551 A.2d 1022, 1029 (App. Div. 1988) (determination of attor-

ney's negligence in accepting settlement required expert testimony); Rorrer v.
Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 356, 329 S.E.2d 355, 366-67 (1985) (expert testimony
necessary to ascertain if attorney failed to exercise standard of care when he
investigated client's case); Storm v. Golden, 371 Pa. Super. 368, 375-76, 538
A.2d 61, 64 (1988) (expert testimony necessary to prove standard of care applicable to representation of client in real estate transaction).
80. 94 Mich. App. 419, 288 N.W.2d 443 (1979). For the facts of Joos, see
supra note 67.

81. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 502, 555 A.2d at 67. The Rizzo court also relied upon
Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975). 520 Pa. at
502, 555 A.2d at 67. In Wright, the court stated that "[iun some circumstances,
the failure of attorney performance may be so clear that a trier of fact may find
professional negligence unaided by the testimony of experts." 47 Cal. App. 3d at
810, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 200 (footnote omitted).
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care." 82 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that "there was
sufficient nonexpert testimony to support the finding that Haines
breached the standard of care by failing to investigate and inform his
83
client of the City's settlement offer."
The Rizzo court refused to decide whether Haines had been negligent in raising the settlement demand to $2,000,000.84 The trial court,

however, stated that the "[d]efendant's conduct in raising the demand
...negated settlement possibilities, was a poor and negligent negotiating tactic in the midst of trial and was a substantial factor in curtailing
settlement discussions and causing the ...

case to not be settled for at

least $750,000."185 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also refused to decide the validity of the trial court's "implicit conclusion that expert testimony was not needed to detail the approximate standard of care
concerning the raising of the settlement demand." 8 6 The court did say
that "[w]hether proof of negligence arising from pretrial or trial settlement strategy is beyond the comprehension of laypersons and requires
expert testimony depends on the particular facts and circumstances of
87
the case."1
Regarding the issue of damages, the Rizzo court initially noted that
"when it is alleged that an attorney has breached his professional obligations to his client, an essential element of the cause of action ...

is proof

of actual loss."88 The court explained that a loss is speculative, as op82. Joos, 94 Mich. App. at 424, 288 N.W.2d at 445. Contra Dorf v. Relles,
355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966) (applying Illinois law).
In Dorf,the plaintiff sued his attorney for malpractice alleging that the attorney failed to disclose a settlement offer and negligently conducted settlement
negotiations. Dorf, 355 F.2d at 490. The plaintiff failed to present expert testimony as to whether the defendant, by the aforementioned conduct, failed to

exercise "ordinary legal knowledge and skill." Id. at 492. The Seventh Circuit
found that "[i]t is not discernible how a jury, without [expert testimony], could
determine what constitutes ordinary legal knowledge and skill common to members of the legal profession." Id. The court also explained that "[i]f ajudgment
against an attorney, on a record such as is before us, can be justified, the legal
profession would be more hazardous than the law contemplates." Id. at 494.
83. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 502, 555 A.2d at 67 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 502 n.10, 555 A.2d at 67 n.10.
85. Rizzo v. Haines, No. 79-623, slip op. at 21 (Pa. C.P. Phila. June 20,
1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 357 Pa. Super. 57, 515 A.2d 321 (1986), aft'd,
520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (1989). The trial judge stated that "Mr. Haines acted
in bad faith and for his own aggrandizement purposes and for his own personal
urposes and negligently when he arbitrarily raised the demand figure to
2,000,000 from $1,200,000. That demand was obviously calculated to close off
discussions. The plaintiff did not authorize such increased demand." Id. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also noted that "there was . . . evidence that

Haines considered the opportunity to try the case to be a cornerstone in building his reputation as a successful plaintiff's attorney." Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 494-95,
555 A.2d at 63.
86. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 502 n.10, 555 A.2d at 67 n.10.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 504, 555 A.2d at 68 (quoting Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 275 Pa.
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posed to actual, "only if the uncertainty concerns the fact of damages
rather than the amount." 8 9 The court concluded that in a legal malpractice action regarding a settlement, "one must establish that the party
against whom the initial claim was asserted . . . would have reached
agreement upon a settlement in an ascertainable amount." 90
Haines contended that the damages in this case were speculative. 9 1
Super. 65, 73-74, 418 A.2d 613, 617 (1980)). The court explained that a breach
of duty causing only nominal or speculative damages does not create a cause of
action for negligence. Id. at 504-05, 555 A.2d at 68 (citing Schenkel v. Monheit,
266 Pa. Super. 396, 399, 405 A.2d 493, 494 (1979)).
89. Id. at 505, 555 A.2d at 68 (quoting Pashak v. Barish, 303 Pa. Super. 559,
561-62, 450 A.2d 67, 69 (1982)) (emphasis in original). The court added that
"[a] verdict may be based on a calculation of damages where there is a reasonable basis for the calculation." Id. (citation omitted); see Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335
Pa. Super. 599, 602, 485 A.2d 56, 58 (1984) (client's assertion that she would
have obtained greater settlement in divorce proceeding had attorney correctly
valued husband's stock held speculative); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 2,
§ 580, at 730 ("When both the likelihood of settlement and the amount can be
supported by evidence, then the fact of injury is no longer speculative.").
90. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 505, 555 A.2d at 68 (citation omitted); see R. MALLEN &
V. LEVIT, supra note 2, § 580, at 730 ("Where there were pending but unconsummated negotiations ... the client may be able to produce evidence (usually
from the adverse attorney or party) of the sum which would have compromised
the case."). In addition, some courts have held that proof of actual loss requires
proof that the defendant in the underlying suit could have funded the settlement. See, e.g., Whiteaker v. State, 382 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Iowa 1986).
91. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 504, 555 A.2d at 68. The court distinguished three
cases advanced by Haines in support of his argument. Id. at 505-06, 555 A.2d at
68. In Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 293, 319 A.2d 781, 783 (Law
Div. 1974), the plaintiff sued her attorney for malpractice because he failed to
institute a suit on her behalf within the limitations period. The plaintiff contended that she lost a potential settlement of her case. Id. at 296, 319 A.2d at
784. The court held that "[b]ecause no expert can suppose with any degree of
reasonable certainty the private blends of hopes and fears that might have come
together to produce a settlement before or during trial, expert testimony as to
reasonable settlement value will be excluded as irrelevant." Id. But see Williams
v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("[T]he probability of settlement would be proved by expert testimony on the usual outcome of similar
cases, including such factors as the merits of the case .... The same expert...
would testify as to the settlement value of the underlying case."). The Rizzo
court distinguished Fuschetti on the grounds that in Fuschetti there was no evidence of settlement offers or the authority of the opposing attorney to settle.
Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 505, 555 A.2d at 68.
In Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, 753, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33
(1960), the plaintiff sued her attorneys for the negligent handling of her personal injury lawsuit. The plaintiff alleged she lost the settlement value of her
suit. Id. at 757, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 35. The court found that the only offer of settlement was for $350, while the plaintiff demanded $100,000. Id. at 758, 8 Cal.
Rptr. at 36. Thus, the court held the possibility of settlement speculative. Id.; see
D. METSELMAN, supra note 14, § 4:1, at 54 ("Even where the attorney is negligent,
such as failure to disclose an offer of settlement, no relief is warranted where the
client concedes that the offer, had it been communicated by the attorney, would
have been rejected."). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished Campbell
based on the fact that in Rizzo "the offers and settlement authority were significantly closer." Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 506, 555 A.2d at 68.
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The court responded by noting that the City's attorney initially had the
authority to settle the case for $300,000 plus a lifetime pension and had
the authority at trial to settle for $750,000.92 The court emphasized that
"firm settlement offers were communicated to Haines, and the attorney
making the offers had the authority to settle."' 93 Thus, the court determined that Rizzo's damages were actual, not speculative. 94 The Rizzo
court also examined the trial court's award of $300,000 in compensatory
damages based on the difference between Rizzo's actual recovery and
what he would have recovered in settlement but for Haines' negligence. 9 5 The Rizzo court concluded that this calculation was proper. 9 6
Finally, Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Zappala, concurred separately in a short opinion. 97 Justice Flaherty expressed his "concern
about creating precedent which imposes liability on an attorney for a
settlement strategy and for not 'second guessing' a jury or being unaware of the actual limits of authority of an opposing attorney during
settlement negotiations of a civil law suit." 98 Justice Flaherty concluded
that the majority opinion did not set such a precedent. 99
In Whiteaker v. State, 382 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 1986), the court held that
a plaintiff seeking to recover for legal malpractice regarding settlement must
prove that he and the "party against whom a claim has been asserted would have
reached agreement upon a settlement in an ascertainable amount." The
Whiteaker court held that the plaintiff's damages were speculative because there
was no evidence that offers were in fact made -or that the opposing counsel had
authority to settle for a certain amount. Id. at 116-17. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court distinguished Whiteaker on the grounds that in Rizzo settlement
offers were made and the City's attorney had the authority to settle the case for
$750,000. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 506, 555 A.2d at 68. For the facts of Whiteaker, see
supra note 67.

92. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 505, 555 A.2d at 68.
93. Id. at 506, 555 A.2d at 68 (emphasis in original).
94. Id.

95. Id. As previously stated, the City's attorney was authorized to settle for
$750,000, and the jury awarded Rizzo $450,000. Id. at 490, 494, 555 A.2d at 60,
62. Thus, Rizzo's damages were $300,000. Id. at 506, 555 A.2d at 68; see D.
MEISELMAN, supra note 14, § 4:2, at 57-58 (customary measure of damages in
legal malpractice cases is amount client would have recovered but for negligence
of his attorney, minus whatever he did recover).
96. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 506, 555 A.2d at 69; see also Aiken Indus. v. Estate of
Wilson, 477 Pa. 34, 44, 383 A.2d 808, 813 ("where there is a basis in the evidence for a reasonable computation of the damages suffered ....

a verdict may

be based thereon, though there may be involved some uncertainty about it;...
nevertheless, where damages are susceptible of being proved the amount must
be established with certainty") (quoting Solar Elec. Corp. v. Exterminator Corp.,
384 Pa. 233, 235, 120 A.2d 533, 534 (1956)) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 877 (1978).

97. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 513, 555 A.2d at 72 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
98. Id. (Flaherty, J., concurring).
99. Id. (Flaherty, J., concurring). Certainly, the communication and investigation of settlement offers cannot be viewed as settlement strategy. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 2, § 580, at 725 (not identifying such as settlement

strategies). Furthermore, Rizzo does not hold an attorney liable for being una-
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ANALYSIS

It is respectfully submitted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
correctly decided Rizzo v. Haines. First, the three-element test adopted
by the court for proving a legal malpractice claim has been adbpted by
the majority of the states and is partially based on the court's own prior
decisions.10 0 Because of the importance of settlement to the judicial
system and litigants, requiring an attorney to exercise ordinary skill and
knowledge in the conduct of settlement negotiations was mandated.' 0 '
Furthermore, the requirement that all settlement offers be communicated to the client is proper in light of precedent that requires an attorney to have the client's permission before settling a case. 10 2 This
requirement is also supported by the newly adopted Pennsylvania Rules
of Professional Conduct. 10 3 In addition, because informing clients of
settlement offers would be of little utility otherwise, the court quite
properly required attorneys to investigate settlement offers. 10 4 Because
an attorney's duty to investigate and communicate settlement offers is
simple and straightforward, Rizzo correctly held that proving the breach
0 5
of those duties does not require expert testimony.'
Although the Rizzo court failed to decide the issue, it is submitted
that an attorney who unreasonably increases a settlement demand is
negligent. 10 6 By such conduct an attorney precludes any chance of settlementjust as surely as the attorney who refuses to negotiate in the first
ware of the limits of his opponent's settlement authority, but for the failure to
investigate settlement offers. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 501, 555 A.2d at 66.
100. See Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 499, 555 A.2d at 65. For a discussion of this test,
see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
101. See Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 499-500, 555 A.2d at 65. For a discussion of the
requirement of ordinary skill and knowledge in the conduct of settlement negotiations, see supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
importance and validity of settlement agreements, see supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
102. See Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 500-01, 555 A.2d at 66 (citations omitted). For a
discussion of an attorney's duty to communicate settlement offers, see supra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the requirement that an
attorney have his client's permission to settle a case, see supra notes 27-35 and
accompanying text.
103. See PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 comment
(1987) ("A lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in
a civil controversy . . . should promptly inform the client of its substance unless
prior discussions with the client have left it clear that the proposal will be unacceptable.") (citation omitted). For a further discussion of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Professional Conduct, see supra note 67.
104. See Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 501, 555 A.2d at 66 (citations omitted). For a
discussion of an attorney's duty to investigate settlement offers, see supra notes
68-70 and accompanying text.
105. See Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 501-02, 555 A.2d at 66. For a discussion on the
general requirement of expert testimony and the court's refusal to require its
use in Rizzo, see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.

106. The trial court in Rizzo found that Haines increased the settlement demand not in Rizzo's best interests, but to serve his own purposes. For a discus-
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instance. Attorneys have been found negligent for conduct which resuited in the failure of a case to settle. For example, in Smiley v.
Manchester Insurance & Indemnity Co. 107 the Illinois court held an attorney
liable for negligently failing to settle a case. 10 8 The court found that the
attorney's failure to make a settlement offer or otherwise attempt settlement resulted in excessive liability for the client. 10 9 Relying on expert
testimony, the Smiley court determined that this conduct violated the
duty of care owed to the client."t 0 Finally, the purposes of settlement
will be frustrated if attorneys can be held liable for refusing to negotiate
settlements, but not for unreasonably increasing settlement demands
when both actions result in the preclusion of settlement."'I
It is also submitted that proving an attorney breached the standard
of care by raising a settlement demand requires expert testimony. "Expert testimony is required when the malpractice issue concerns tactical
and judgmental matters.'' 12 The trial court in Rizzo concluded that
sion of the trial court's findings in this regard, see supra note 85 and
accompanying text.

107. 49 Ill.
App. 3d 675, 364 N.E.2d 683 (1977), aff'd, 71 Ill.
2d 306, 375
N.E.2d 118 (1978). In Smiley, the defendant attorney was authorized to settle a
case up to a certain dollar amount. Id. at 678, 364 N.E.2d at 686. He never

communicated this authority to the opposing counsel, nor did he ever attempt to
settle the case. Id. at 678-79, 364 N.E.2d at 686. After an adverse verdict in
excess of the amount for which the defendant was authorized to settle, his client
sued him for legal malpractice. Id. at 679, 364 N.E.2d at 687.

108. Id. at 680, 364 N.E.2d at 687.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 536
F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying California law) (attorney held negligent for
actions which prevented settlement of case that would otherwise have settled);
Schlossberg v. Epstein, 73 Md. App. 415, 432-37, 534 A.2d 1003, 1012-14
(1988) (attorneys who refused to settle case without being fully informed may be
held negligent for failure to settle).
While there are no reported cases regarding whether the unreasonable raising of a settlement demand can constitute negligence, an artificially high settlement demand has been recognized as a legitimate settlement tactic, at least
when used early in the negotiation process. C. CRAVER, supra note 18, at 116
("[it] behooves bargainers to commence their [settlement negotiations] with
high demands"); H. MILLER, supra note 17, § 5.07 (It is recommended that "in
the early stages of negotiation, before settlement talks begin in earnest, that the
settlement demand be high."). It is clear, however, that Haines set forth a high
settlement demand late in his negotiations with the City. It must also be noted
that events during the trial may legitimately increase the settlement value of a
case.
111. For a discussion on the importance of settlement, see supra notes 1922 and accompanying text.
112. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 2, § 665, at 839 (footnote omitted).
Expert testimony is also required regarding the possible negligence of "decisions concerning whether and in what manner to settle the claim." Id. (footnote
omitted). As the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently explained:
Legal malpractice claims run a wide gamut of circumstances from clear
cut claims of a breach of an attorney's duty for allowing the statute of
limitations to run against the former client's cause of action to the com-
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Haines' raising the settlement demand was a negotiation tactic., 1 3 Additionally, in Gans v. Mundy' 1 4 the Third Circuit determined that a plaintiff must use expert testimony to prove that his attorneys were negligent
for failing to sue an additional party.' 15 The court concluded that the
decision not to sue was a "strategic one" and held that whether the attorneys breached the standard of care with this decision required expert
testimony."1 6 Furthermore, in the majority of cases dealing with the
negligent conduct of settlement negotiations, as opposed to the
straightforward failure to investigate or communicate settlement offers,
the courts have required expert testimony."1 7 Therefore, because raising a settlement demand is a tactical decision, and is not "so simple [that
any] lack of skill [is] so obvious," expert testimony is required to prove
breach of the standard of care.' 18
IV.

CONCLUSION

By following the guidelines set forth in Rizzo, attorneys engaged in
plex determination required of a claim of breach of duty involving the
attorney's choice of trial tactics in which a layperson's judgment obviously requires guidance. Between these two extremes lie a myriad
number of legal malpractice actions for which the necessity of expert
evidence to establish the attorney's duty and breach thereof will not be
readily evident without careful examination of the factual circumstances
upon which they arise.
Storm v. Golden, 371 Pa. Super. 368, 376-77, 538 A.2d 61, 65 (1988) (footnote
omitted).
113. Rizzo v. Haines, No. 79-623, slip op. at 21 (Pa. C.P. Phila. June 20,
1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 357 Pa. Super. 57, 515 A.2d 321 (1986), aft'd,

520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (1989).
114. 762 F.2d 338 (3d Cir.) (applying Pennsylvania law), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1010 (1985). In Gans, the plaintiff was injured when his employer's bus
collided with a bus owned by the South Eastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA). Id. at 340. The defendant attorneys filed suit against the
employer, but not against SEPTA. Id. The plaintiff alleged that their failure to
sue SEPTA was negligent. Id.
115. Id. at 343.
116. Id. at 343-44.
117. See, e.g., Applegate v. Dobrovir, Oakes & Gebhardt, 628 F. Supp. 378,
382 (D.D.C. 1985) (legal and practical difficulty of second-guessing propriety of
eve-of-trial settlement required expert testimony), aff'd without opinion, 809 F.2d
930 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987); Smiley v. Manchester Ins. &
Indemnity Co., 49 Ill. App. 3d 675, 680, 364 N.E.2d 683, 687 (1977) (expert
testimony necessary with respect to determination of negligence regarding attorney's failure to attempt settlement), aff'd, 71 I11.2d 306, 375 N.E.2d 118
(1978); Pongonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005, 1005, 486 N.E.2d 28, 29 (1985) (expert testimony necessary to establish that attorney negligently advised client to
accept settlement offer). See generally Annotation, supra note 76, at 198-200.
118. See Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir.
1979) (applying Pennsylvania law) (Expert testimony is required to establish the
standard of care and whether it was complied with "except where the matter
under investigation is so simple, and the lack of skill so obvious, as to be within
the range of the ordinary experience and comprehension of non-professional
persons.") (citations omitted). For the facts of Lentino, see supra note 78.
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settlement negotiations in Pennsylvania can avoid liability and better
serve their clients. First, whenever an attorney receives a settlement offer, he or she must investigate it.1 19 This duty merely requires obtaining or reasonably attempting to obtain from the offering attorney
details as to what the offer encompasses.' 20 In Rizzo, this meant only
that Haines had a duty to take reasonable steps to determine exactly
what the City's pension offer entailed.' 2 ' Haines met this duty simply
by writing the City's attorney in request for specific information on the
pension.' 22 The duty to investigate also requires that an attorney respond to any indications by opposing counsel that a higher settlement
23
amount can be offered.1
Second, whenever an attorney receives a settlement offer, he or she
must communicate it to the client after investigating it.1 24 An attorney
should first investigate and then communicate a settlement offer because
12 5
the client may seek advice on whether the offer should be accepted.
Furthermore, what may later prove to be poor advice could lead to a
legal malpractice suit. 1 26 Additionally, it is clear that settlement offers
27
should be either confirmed or communicated to the client in writing.1
This is because "[wihere the issue is the alleged uncommunicated [settlement] offer, the case usually becomes a battle of credibility that the
lawyer, if he lacks documentation or court transcription, is likely to
28
lose."1
In conclusion, if an attorney simply investigates and communicates
119. See Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 501, 555 A.2d at 66.
120. See id.

121. Id.
122. Id. It should be remembered that Haines could have asked the City's
attorney what the pension offer entailed when it was made at the pretrial settlement conference. See id. at 493, 555 A.2d at 62. This is the better practice since
it will guarantee not only a response, but an immediate response. Although
Haines met his duty to investigate by writing to the City's attorney, he never
received a reply. Id. at 493, 501, 555 A.2d at 62, 66.

123. See id. at 501, 555 A.2d at 66.
124. See id.
125. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 14, § 10:7, at 173; see PENNSYLVANIA RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1987) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter
to the extent necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
126. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvIT, supra note 2, § 580, at 724; see also Fishman
v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 646, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1379 (1986) ("[A]n attorney is
liable for negligently causing a client to settle a claim for an amount below what
a properly represented client would have accepted.") (citations omitted).
127. R. MALLEN & V. LEvIT, supra note 2, § 12, at 33 ("If the attorney regularly discusses matters in person and by telephone with his client, he should
confirm these discussions and significant events in writing, and forward pertinent documents on a regular basis."); Grasso, Defensive Lawyering: How to Keep
Your Clientsfrom Suing You, A.B.A. J. 98, 98 (Oct. 1989) ("An attorney's thin file
becomes a fat target in an action for legal malpractice.").
128. Grasso, supra note 127, at 98.
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settlement offers, that attorney will help to avoid the possibility of a
legal malpractice suit and will better serve the client with respect to settlement.
Martin C. Bryce, Jr.
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